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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Reading Paul van den Hoven’s paper, I was reminded of the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) that effectively ended the 2000 Presidential election 
campaign and handed the Presidency to George Bush. Like all Supreme Court decisions, 
it was built on a detailed statement of the facts of the case, addressed the arguments in 
play and the relevant Constitutional principles, and gave a rationale for the decision 
rendered. It was a decision that surprised a lot of people—not because the decision was 
unexpected, but because the rationale of the Court was taken to be an unusually 
transparent front for the real reasons and motives for the majority (5-4) decision. Justices 
aren’t supposed to be partisan (the majority 5 were appointed by Republicans; the 
minority dissenters all by Democrats) or practically motivated (there was a strong sense 
of “Enough, already!”). A desire to uphold the Constitution is supposed to be the 
overriding motive and the opinion of the Court should give a rationale that convincing 
based on that consideration alone. And to many, the decision just didn’t look like it did 
that job.  
I was also reminded of how the news media’s follow-up to President Obama’s 
nomination of  Sonia Sotomayor for the Supreme Court reflected the assumptions that the 
Court had become a “deeply political institution” (Douthat 2009) and that Justices would 
allow all sorts of non-Constitutional considerations to intrude into their decisions.  
Both cases illustrate an interesting tension that I take to be central to van den 
Hoven’s paper. It is this: We all know that all kinds of personal, political, social, and 
cultural factors can influence legal decision-making. But they aren’t supposed to. And we 
don’t like it when they do. Furthermore, we assume that they don’t have to, or at least we 
assume that the influence of such factors can be minimized.  
Now, my take on this tension is a little different than van den Hoven’s. He sees 
lurking behind this tension a modernist ideology that is a myth. The myth is that facts and 
legal principle sort of speak for themselves and inevitably determine (for a rational judge) 
the conclusion to be drawn. Maybe that ideology is at work in legal decisions. It certainly 
is a myth if it is at work. But I think a less ambitious claim can be made: We try to keep 
out these “illegitimate” influences by requiring that any decision be justified by 
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arguments that are based on, and only on, the facts of the case, the arguments made, and 
the law. The problem is that we don’t like the wiggle room this still affords individual 
decision-makers. Moreover, many of the discursive tactics that we use to promote this 
kind of justification don’t always work as well as we’d like and in any case become 
empty exercises when deployed by people who don’t know what they’re doing. This is 
the difference between genuine strategy that is heuristically functional and mere style and 
hollow conventions that only gives the appearance of reasoned justification. So the 
problem is that this defensive Line of Reasoned Justification gets breached too often, and 
even when it does hold, the Enemies of Reason find ways to get around it and do all sorts 
of trouble.  
Van den Hoven seems to think this line of defence is pointless. I wonder where 
we go if we abandon it. Take the three cases in point to which van den Hoven draws our 
attention. The first is order of presentation. Van den Hoven suggests that the conventional 
order of presenting reasoning-then-conclusion simply promotes a (false) impression of 
objective inevitability to the decision while harming comprehensibility. He seems to 
think that an order that puts conclusion first would be more easily comprehended. That 
may be true. It’s an empirical matter that we could find out. But I worry about the reverse 
cost. If this conventional order implicates objectivity, think what is communicated by 
using the opposite order. I worry that if the conventional order does in fact implicate 
objectivity, then deliberately using the unconventional order is going to implicate 
subjectivity, partiality, and arbitrariness. Do we really want that accepted and expressed 
in our legal decisions? 
Take the other two cases: the conventional sections of the decision and the 
linguistic conventions that suppress personal agency and judgment. I agree entirely with 
van den Hoven that filling in the sections in the decision can become an empty exercise 
and that the language stylistics can become a mere form of posturing. Interestingly, 
Bazerman (1988) makes very similar observations about the APA Manual of Style and its 
effects on the writing style in the experimental research reports in psychology. But again, 
even if the effects of such stylistic conventions is merely to convey adherence to a norm 
of objectivity, what would be the effect of deliberately flouting such conventions? Do we 
want to communicate that? And if we don’t, how is that to be avoided, and avoided 
convincingly? 
There is another observation to be made about all these conventions: They do 
have a point, a function, even if writers do not always understand that point or how the 
convention functions strategically to promote that point. I can take my own experience as 
a student in experimental psychology. One of the first things I had to learn was how to 
write a research report and how to write in the style expected of an “objective” 
researcher. And I can report from first-hand experience that the writing style has a point: 
It gets you to observe in the desired way. It’s not that I became objective in any deep 
metaphysical sense—but I did learn to look at my rats and my subjects differently, to note 
different facts, and to find visible signs and evidence for my own inferences and 
judgments. There is a real effect here, just as making people fill-in certain sections in 
their reports makes them do the things they have to write-up (like do a literature review, 
plan a research design, use a standard research protocol). Those categories don’t prevent 
shallow or sloppy work—but they do promote attention to better work for those who care 
to do it. I have no doubt that similar rationales lie behind legal documents. And maybe 
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those rationales would be best served by teaching people what those rationales are, 
explaining the functions, showing their point. When conventional practice appears to be a 
hollow exercise, perhaps the diagnosis should extend to the way the practices are taught.  
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